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CoRPORATIONs-D1ssoLuTioN-PAYMBNT OF "Accmmn UNPAID DIVIDENDS"
PREFERRED SHAREHOLDERS FROM CAPITAL-The Big Bend Land Company
was in the process of liquidation. The articles of incorporation provided for preferred stock which "in the event of any liquidation ..." was "..• entitled to be
paid in full the par value thereof, and all accrued unpaid dividends thereon before
any sum shall be paid to or any assets distributed among . . ." the common
stock. 1 No dividends had ever been declared or paid, nor had there ever been
any surplus profits. After discharging all corporate liabilities, including payment
of the par value of the preferred stock, the liquidating trustees brought suit for
a declaratory judgment as to the disposition of the substantial assets remaining.
A Washington statute provided that "It shall not be lawful for the trustees to
make any dividend except from the net profits arising from the business of the
corporation, nor divide, withdraw, or in any way pay to the stockholders, or any
of them, any part of the capital stock of the company . . . Provided, that this
section shall not be construed to prevent a division and distribution of the capital stock of the company which shall remain after the payment of all its debts
upon the dissolution of the corporation."2 The trial court found that the "accrued unpaid dividends" should be paid to preferred shareholders from the assets
prior to any distribution to the common shareholders. On appeal, held, affirmed.
Hay v. Hay, (Wash. 1951) 230 P. (2d) 791 (1951).
Whether upon dissolution a corporation should be said to pay "accrued
unpaid dividends" from capital to holders of cumulative preferred stock is generally considered a matter of construction of the articles of incorporation.8 In
the absence of any provision in the articles,4 all shareholders would divide
equally the assets remaining after payment of creditors.5 The decision of the
principal case in interpreting the articles of incorporation to make provision for
payment from the remaining assets of an amount equal to "accrued unpaid
TO

1 Principal case at
2 Wash. Rev. Stat.

793.
(Remington, 1940) §3823.
3 STBVENs, CoRPORATIONs 473 (1949); 12 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP., peon. ed., §5449
(1932); cases collected, 133 A.L.R. 666 (1941).
4 MUiphy v. Richardson Dry Goods Co., 326 Mo. 1, 31 S.W. (2d) 72 (1930) held
that provision in the by-laws would be ineffective.
5 Continental Insurance Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 156 at 181, 42 S.Ct. 540
(1921).
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dividends" seems logical,6 is in accord with the great weight of authority, 7 and
complies with the generally understood significance of these words.8 Although
the c°ijssenting opinion disagrees with this interpretation of the articles, 9 of more
interest is the view of the dissent that the Washington statute10 prohibits any
contract in the articles which would result in an unequal distribution of the
assets.11 For such an interpretation of the statute, the dissent relies upon two
cases which construe statutes in New York and Wisconsin. The New York
case12 is spoken of as "fortified by a statute the same as : .." the Washington
statute.13 The Wisconsin case14 is said to construe a statute "... of the same
import as the [Washington statute] . . . but . . . more specific in its wording. . . ."15 However, the New York case does not construe the New York
statute to prohibit the shareholders from contracting in the articles for unequal
distribution of assets, but uses the statute to interpret the contract.16 On the
other hand, the Wisconsin case follows a statute which, by expressly prohibiting
such a contract, leaves no room for interpretation which would allow unequal
distribution.17 Therefore, to equate the Washington statute to both the New
York and Wisconsin statutes seems erroneous. The majority, correctly, it is
believed, construes the statute to have no application in the principal case by
distinguishing between a corporation as a going concern with possible creditors'
claims and one in liquidation when all creditors' claims are satisfied.18 It should
be remembered that in the absence of a statute comparable to that in Wisconsin
expressly limiting distribution of remaining assets other than profits on dissolution, the problem considered here is one which should be met by exact draftsmanship of the articles of incorporation.
Frank M. Bowen, Jr.
6 If the clause in question was intended to relate only to distribution of net profits or
surplus, then it would add nothing to the prior clauses, and would be .mere surplusage.
See 40 YALB L.J. 828 (1931).
7 Supra note 3.
SWillson v. Laconia Car Co., 275 Mass. 435 at 441, 176 N.E. 182 (1931), quoted
in principal case at 794.
9 Principal case at 797.
10 Supra note 2.
11 Principal case at 798.
12 Michael v. Cayey-Caguas Tobacco Co., 190 App. Div. 618, 180 N.Y.S. 532 (1920),
noted 6 CoRN. L.Q. 103 (1920). See 34 HARv. L. REv. 303 (1920).
13 Principal case at 800.
14 Hull v. Pfister & Vogel Leather Co., 235 Wis. 653, 294 N.W. 18 (1940).
15 Principal case at 800.
16 "It is, of course, competent for shareholders to contract between themselves and the
company as to what their respective rights shall be. . .. The question to be answered is the
interpretation of that contract." Michael v. Cayey-Caguas Tobacco Co., 180 N.Y.S. 532
at 535 (1920).
17Wis. Stat. (1929) §182.13: "Any corporation may ... provide ••• for a preference
of such preferred stock not exceeding the par value thereof, over the common stock in the
distribution of the corporate assets other than profits." This restriction is no longer present.
Wis. Stat. (1949) §182.13.
.
18 Principal case at 797. See Fawkes v. Farm Lands Investment Co., 112 Cal. App.
374, 297 P. 47 (1931) for interpretation of a similar statute; note, 30 M:rcH. L. REv. 281
(1931).

